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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

CONSUMER PROTECTION-DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-AVOIDING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER IMPLIED WARRANTIES EXTEND To PROFESSIONAL SERVICES BY DEFINING HORSE TRAINING AS A MODIFICATION
OF AN EXISTING TANGIBLE GOOD. Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 755

S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988).

In the spring of 1982, John Archibald placed Gayle Silva Robyn
("Robyn"), an Arabian mare, in Act III Arabians' ("Act III") show training
program. Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 741 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1987), rev'd and remanded, 755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988).
Act III was to train the mare in the English pleasure riding style. Id.
Robyn proved difficult to train. Id. When commanded to trot, the mare
would buck. Id. On November 11, 1982, one of Act III's trainers, determined to correct the mare's bucking habit, put Robyn through a "particularly strenuous training session." Id. As a result of the trainer's extensive
use of his riding crop, welts developed on the horse's hindquarters. Id.
Although she was treated three days later by a veterinarian for abrasions and
swelling, Robyn's skin became dry and leatherlike and sloughed off. Id. The
skin condition began to improve when Robyn developed founder, a disease
caused by the impairment of blood circulation to the hoof which results in
lameness. Id. By January 17, 1983, the mare was so incapacitated by the
founder that "she had to be destroyed." Id.
John Archibald sued Act III alleging negligence and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA"). Archibald,
755 S.W.2d at 85. The jury found Act III negligent in its training but failed
to find that its negligence was the proximate cause of Robyn's death. Id.
Under the DTPA theory, although the jury found that Act III's failure to
train the horse in a good and workmanlike manner was a producing cause of
the mare's death and that the fair market value of the horse was $75,000, the
trial court asserted that under Texas law no implied warranties for services
exist and rendered a take nothing judgment. Id. The court of appeals stated
that the principle issue for appeal was whether "an implied warranty of good
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and workmanlike performance of personal services rendered by a professional" existed under Texas law and affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that no such implied warranty had been established in Texas. Archibald
v. Act III Arabians, 741 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1987), rev'd and remanded, 755 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. 1988). The Texas Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the implied warranty to repair or modify existing tangible goods or property in a good and workmanlike manner established in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.
1987), extended to horse training services. Archibald, 755 S.W.2d at 86.
A consumer may bring a cause of action under section 17.50(a)(2) of the
DTPA where breach of an express or implied warranty is a producing cause
of actual damages. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon
1987). However, the DTPA does not establish any express or implied warranties. La Sara Grain Co. v. First National Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d
558, 565 (Tex. 1984). Therefore, to maintain an action under section
17.50(a)(2), the consumer must rely upon warranties expressly created by
contract or those implied by statute or common law. Id. A consumer acquiring goods will be able to take advantage of the warranties implied under
the Texas Business and Commerce Code's provisions. Id.; see also TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314-2.315 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968)(implying warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose).
However, a consumer of services has a more difficult task since he must rely
exclusively upon those warranties created by the courts. See Melody Home,
741 S.W.2d at 353-54 (no statutory or common-law implied warranties for
services but service warranty applicable to repairs or modifications of tangible goods); see also Humber v. Morton, 726 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1968)(establishing implied warranty of good and workmanlike manner and
suitability for human habitation applicable to house construction).
The Texas Supreme Court has previously decided cases in which the need
to create an implied warranty was at issue. The court's willingness to extend
such a warranty was based on public policy considerations. See Melody
Home, 741 S.W.2d at 354. For example, in Dennis v. Allison, a patient
brought an action against her doctor after she was beaten and sexually assaulted during the course of psychiatric treatment. Dennis v. Allison, 698
S.W.2d 94, 94 (Tex. 1985). The court observed that implied warranty theories had previously been extended only where the plaintiff's burden of proof
under other theories made recovery impossible due to the plaintiff's lack of
access to necessary information. Id. at 95 (discussing history of implied warranty adoption in Texas). The court noted that, in a professional service
situation, the client could readily determine the exact person responsible for
the injury and the specific wrong committed, implying that no great burden
of proof would be imposed by other theories of recovery. Id. at 96. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff patient had adequate remedies
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and held that no implied warranty was necessary in professional service
transactions. Id. In contrast, the Texas Supreme Court examined a situation in Melody Home in which it decided an implied warranty was necessary.
See Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 354.
In Melody Home, the Barnes' brought a suit for damages after they suffered extensive water damage to their home caused by the defendant's improper repairs. See Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 351. The court analyzed
several strict liability policies, including the need to protect rather than
merely compensate consumers and the ability of the parties to prevent or
distribute the loss, and concluded that the policies favored an extension of an
implied warranty to repair services. Id. at 353-54. In addition, the court
reasoned that since the legislature refused to exempt services from the scope
of the DTPA, legislative history supported the creation of a service warranty. Id. at 354. Thus, the court held that public policy necessitated the
extension of an implied warranty "to repair or modify tangible goods or
property in a good and workmanlike manner" to all service transactions. Id.
After comparing the holdings in Dennis and Melody Home, two interrelated questions arise. Does the Melody Home warranty apply to transactions
involving professional services; and, if not, what types of services are included within the court's definition of "professional"? In the first opinion
issued in Melody Home, the court overruled Dennis and held that the Melody
Home warranty extended to all service providers including professionals.
Melody Home, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 489, 491 (June 17, 1987), withdrawn, 741
S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987). However, on rehearing, the Texas Supreme Court
reserved judgment on the issue, stating that "[tihe question whether an implied warranty applies to services in which the essence of the transaction is
the exercise of professional judgment by the service provider is not before
us." Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 354.
In framing the issue to be decided in Archibald, the Texas Supreme Court
ignored the court of appeals' evaluation of the main issue. See Archibald,
755 S.W.2d at 87 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (asserting majority failed to address court of appeal's reasoning). The court of appeals had stated that the
principle issue for appeal was whether Texas law recognized "an implied
warranty of good and workmanlike performance of personal services rendered by a professional." Archibald, 741 S.W.2d at 958. Unfortunately, the
court of appeals incorrectly interpreted the Melody Home warranty as only
applicable to sellers whose contract involved a service associated with the
creation of a tangible product. Id. at 959. Perhaps if the court of appeals
had expressly rejected the Melody Home warray du,, to the "professional"
nature of the services, the Texas Supreme Court would have been forced to
address the issue. However, the Texas Supreme Court blindly asserted that
the dispositive issue in Archibald was whether horse training services fell
within the scope of the Melody Home warranty without reference to the
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word "professional." Archibald, 755 S.W.2d at 85; see also Archibald, 755
S.W.2d at 87 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (pointing out court's omission). The
court stated that the Melody Home warranty, by its very terms, extends to a
vast array of services. Archibald, 755 S.W.2d at 85. Citing Black's Law
Dictionary and a case involving a guaranty agreement to a note, the court
defined modification as "any change or alteration that 'introduces new elements into the details [of the subject matter] or cancels some of them' but
which leaves 'the general purpose and effect of the subject matter intact.'"
Id. at 86 (citing Black's Law Dictionary and Webb v. FingerContractSupply
Co., 447 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. 1969)). The court then reasoned that since
horse training introduces "new elements" which enhance the horse's capabilities and personality and extinguishes undesirable traits thereby altering
the animal's demeanor and skills, training is a modification. Id. Therefore,
under a definitional analysis, the court held that the Melody Home warranty
applied to horse training services. Id. at 86.
Justice Gonzalez dissented, stating that the court's analysis fell short of
the crucial issue. Id. at 87 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Justice Gonzalez asserted that Dennis controlled the case's outcome because horse training is a
professional service. Id. He further argued that an implied warranty guaranteeing error free performance was inconsistent with the nature of a professional's service. Id. However, in reaching this conclusion, Justice Gonzalez
failed to recall the caution issued by the court in Melody Home. See Melody
Home, 741 S.W.2d at 355 & n.8 (noting that Gonzalez's concurring opinion
overlooked essence of holding in that case also). The court stated that it was
not requiring a guarantee of results but merely that repair or modification
services be performed in a good and workmanlike manner. Id. at 355.
Therefore, while the dissent correctly defined the issue of the case, it reached
a conclusion based on an inaccurate interpretation of the requirements imposed by the Melody Home warranty.
The most productive aspect of the Archibald dissent was its attempt to
define the term "professional services." Justice Gonzalez stated that a "professional service" is any service requiring "the exercise of intellectual skill,
judgment and discretion." Archibald, 755 S.W.2d at 87 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). However, the type of service performed in Archibald greatly differs
from the professions considered in Dennis. Compare Archibald, 755 S.W.2d
at 85 (horse training) with Dennis, 698 S.W.2d at 95-96 (psychiatrists, physicians, and optometrists). The types of professional services listed in Dennis
require licensing and, in certain occupations, the adherence to strict ethical
standards, which do not apply to horse trainers. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. arts. 4495-4512 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988)(physician regulations);
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4512c (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988)(psychology regulations): Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 4552-1.01--4552-6.04
(Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988)(optometry regulations). See generally Coin-
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ment, Expansion of Implied Warranty Coverage Under the DTPA: Service
Contracts, 17 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 917, 937 & n.128 (1986)(noting internal and
external regulations of occupational categories society labels "professions"
and specifically detailing regulation of attorneys in Texas). Perhaps the
court failed to address the "professional" issue because it did not consider a
horse trainer to be a "professional." If the policy basis for the extension of
an implied warranty is the need to piotect rather than merely compensate
consumers, the definition of "professional services" should arguably be limited to those professions which require licensing, thereby ensuring that only
those persons who have obtained a requisite level of knowledge and skill
could perform the service. See Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 353 (listing
protection of consumer as policy reason for extending implied warranty).
The crucial issue raised in Archibald was whether the Melody Home warranty extended to professional services and, if not, what services are to be
classified as "professional" and excluded from the scope of the warranty.
Although the dissent and numerous commentators have expressed their
opinion as to the proper resolution of the issue, the Texas Supreme Court
failed to address the question. See Archibald, 755 S.W.2d at 87 (Gonzalez,
J., dissenting) (asserting majority failed to address issue and concluding no
warranty necessary). See generally Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions - Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974
Utah L. Rev. 661, 683-96, 707-08 (analyzing arguments for and against extension of warranty to all service transactions and concluding extension appropriate); Note, The Application of Implied Warranties to Predominantly
"Service" Transactions,31 Ohio St. L.J. 580, 594-95 (1970)(evaluating and
approving New Jersey court decision extending warranties to services);
Comment, The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices- Consumer ProtectionAct:
Application to Professional Malpractice, 8 St. Mary's L.J. 763, 764-69
(1977)(arguing purpose and scope of DTPA support inclusion of professional services); Note, Consumer Protection - Deceptive Trade PracticesBreach of Implied Warranty Requiring Goods or Property to be Modified or
Repaired in Good and Workmanlike Manner Actionable Under Deceptive
Trade Practices- Consumer Protection Act, 19 St. Mary's L.J. 791, 806-07
(1988)(providing several justifications for not extending implied warranties
to professional services); Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response
to the New Industrial State: The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 401, 423-50 (1974)(arguing policies call
for extension of implied warranties and enterprise liability to services); Comment, Guidelinesfor Extending Implied Warranties to Service Markets, 125
U. Pa. L. Rev. 365, 413 (1976)(analyzing court decisions on implied warranties in service situations and stating that under certain circumstances implied
warranties necessary for professional services). As Justice Gonzalez correctly stated in his dissent, the court's failure to address the crucial issue in
Archibald "raises more questions than it answers, and will require years of
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costly litigation to remedy." Archibald, 755 S.W.2d at 87 (Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting).
Wendy Hunkele
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